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 Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the Federal Reserve System’s dissemination of information strategy to see how 
well it has worked and how it can be improved. The System provides information to a broad spectrum 
of individuals and organizations (such as, but not limited to, the Congress, other federal agencies, state 
and local governments, consumer and community groups, analysts, bankers, investors, researchers and 
academics, financial institutions regulated by the System, the media, and the general public), referred to 
as "stakeholders". This information covers an array of subjects with varying degrees of importance and 
impact on monetary and public policy and economic conditions. 
 Social media is a relatively recent innovation that allows for corporate communications opportuni-
ties that a decade ago would not have been plausible. In particular, social media allows companies to 
communicate directly and instantly with their stakeholders, marking a shift from the traditional one-way 
to two-way communication. Engaging in social media has not been as straight forward for central banks. 
 With approximately two billion people using social media around the world, central banks must 
seriously consider how to engage with stakeholders through alternative channels. And simply establish-
ing a presence on social media is not enough – stakeholders will increasingly expect banks to use social 
channels to deliver faster and more effective information about monetary policy and financial stabiliza-
tion; share upcoming events; offer knowledge about regulations; and provide a feedback mechanism 
about the accomplishment of their policy objectives. Most central banks are not delivering such services 
today. 
 The evidence collected, for the first time, shows a high level of discrepancy in relation to the use 
of social media channels to disseminate information among Banks in the Federal Reserve System. First, 
the overall quality, and frequency of information available to their stakeholders in their websites varies. 
Second, the use of social media channels in terms of content, quality, and frequency is also distinct. 
Third, the use of channels is highly concentrated: (i) in the case of Facebook, The New York Bank 
represents 35.3% of total followers, with St. Louis and San Francisco with nearly 17.0% each; (ii) for 
YouTube, The Board of Governors accounts for 65.5% of total followers; (iii) for Twitter, The Board 
represents 39.5% of total followers; and (iv) in the case of LinkedIn, The Board represents 31.4% of 
total followers, with Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco with nearly 10.0% each. 
 Overall, the Federal Reserve System adopts and makes available to stakeholders the same platforms 
for the dissemination of information. They use the same general structure of alternatives, but with sig-
nificant differences in accessibility, availability, and quality. There are many options to improve the 
current offerings in these three attributes when one takes into account not only the best practice within 
the System but also that adopt by central banks in other jurisdictions, and even organizations in the 
private sector. The social media channels should be considered by central banks not as an instrument 
for better transparency but, instead, as an up-to-date communication instrument. An even more restricted 
environment is observed for the Banks’ presidents, with only three of them present on social medias 
(two on Facebook and two on Twitter). The president of the Dallas Bank communicates using both 
channels. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: E58, E59 
Keywords: Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Banks, Fed, Central Bank Communication, Cen-
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1 Introduction 
 
In most countries, the formation of economic policy is a balancing act between achieving high economic 
growth and financial stability, while targeting low inflation. The relative importance of these objectives 
is dynamic, and varies depending on the prevailing local and external conditions. In general, these con-
ditions comprise not only economic but also political and economic issues and directives. The role of 
the central bank in policy formulation and implementation is undisputed.1 
 In order to delivery on its mission a central bank is accountable for its actions to a great variety of 
stakeholders (individuals and organizations), which include, but are not limited to, the Congress, other 
federal agencies, state and local governments, consumer and community groups, analysts, bankers, in-
vestors, researchers and academics, financial institutions regulated by the bank, the media, and the gen-
eral public.2 The dissemination of information to these stakeholders is a major action performed by cen-
tral banks, especially when one takes into account the immense resources necessary to respond to the 
varied demand presented by these stakeholders in terms of the attributes of the information provided to 
them. In general, central banks do a lot of communication, but how well are they doing it? Are they 
engaging effectively with their stakeholders? 
 Most studies of central banks communication focus on speeches, press releases, minutes, and tran-
scripts, especially within the context of monetary policy conduct. These are the "traditional" platforms. 
And, even though many of those attributes are thoroughly discussed no detailed analyses have been done 
about the platforms of communication, and social media channels used by central banks in different 
jurisdictions. The term "social media" refers to online instruments of communication, which are used to 
create, share and exchange information and ideas. The eight main social media channels currently in use 
are: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, Flickr, Pinterest, Google+, and Slideshare. In most cases, 
central banks use social media to communicate and inform stakeholders of their role and ongoing work. 
 The Federal Reserve System disseminates information to a broad spectrum of stakeholders. This 
information covers an array of subjects with varying degrees of importance and impact on monetary and 
public policy and economic conditions. In most cases the use of social media channels by the Board of 
Governors and the Reserve Banks is simply a complement to the more traditional forms of communica-
tion. More than that, the usual website design currently and independently used by almost the entire 
Federal Reserve System indicates an immense gap compared to the best practices or even that adopted 
by central banks which have a more profound preoccupation not only about content but also form in the 
communications’ platform. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives and overview of the Federal 
Reserve System, focusing on responsibilities, decentralized structure, Board of Governors, and organi-
zational structure. Section 3 presents general information data about the 12 regional Federal Reserve 
Banks. Section 4 summarizes some of the issues related to corporate communication and, in particular, 
social media. Section 5, the core of the paper, evaluates the dissemination of information by the Federal 
Reserve System and the role of transparency, reputational risk, and communication of monetary policy 
to its stakeholders. Section 6 evaluates the two main forms of communication used, websites and social 
media channels. Finally, Section 7 concludes and provides some suggestions for future research. 
 
 
  
                                                     
1. For a discussion of the role of central banks see, e.g., Blinder (1998), Bank of England (2013), and Reis (2013). 
2. In most organizations stakeholders also overlap. 
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2 The Federal Reserve System 
 
The Federal Reserve System is the central bank of the United States. It was created on December 23, 
1913, when President Woodrow Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act into law.3 The system is com-
posed of a central, independent government agency – the Board of Governors – in Washington, D.C., 
and 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks, located in major cities throughout the country. This structure is 
unique among central centrals in developed and developing regions.4 
 The Federal Reserve Banks are not a part of the federal government, but they exist because of an 
act of Congress. Their purpose is to serve the public. In this sense, the Federal Reserve System is both 
private and public. While the Board of Governors is an independent government agency, the Federal 
Reserve Banks are set up like private corporations.5 
 The Federal Reserve does not receive funding through the congressional budgetary process. The 
Fed's income comes primarily from: (i) interest on government securities that it has acquired through 
open market operations; (ii) interest on foreign currency investments held by the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem; (iii) fees received for services provided to depository institutions; and (iv) interest on loans to de-
pository institutions. After paying its expenses, the Federal Reserve turns the rest of its earnings over to 
the U.S. Treasury. 
 The Federal Reserve System as it exists today is somewhat different than its original form, due to 
substantial – but rare – overhauls over the years. The three most important changes occurred in response 
to the Great Depression, during the 1930’s, the mini-crisis of the late 1970’s, and the subprime crisis of 
2007, which developed into a full global financial (banking and sovereign) crisis in the following years. 
 
2.1 Responsibilities 
 
The Federal Reserve System conducts the nation’s monetary policy and maintains the stability of the 
financial system,6 through the interactions of three key entities: The Federal Reserve Board of Gover-
nors (Board of Governors), the Federal Reserve Banks (Reserve Banks), and the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC). Its current mandate of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates was established by an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act in 1977. 
 
  
                                                     
3. Federal Reserve Act: Public Law 63-43, 63d Congress, H.R. 7837: An Act to Provide for the Establishment of Federal 
Reserve Banks, to Furnish an Elastic Currency, to Afford Means of Rediscounting Commercial Paper, to Establish a More 
Effective Supervision of Banking in the United States, and for Other Purposes. The Act was also known at the time as the 
Currency Bill, or the Owen-Glass Act. The House of Representatives passed the Federal Reserve Act by a vote of 298 to 60, 
and the Senate by 43 votes to 25. In both chambers of Congress, it was the anti-banker Democrats that overwhelmingly sup-
ported the Act, while for the most part the pro-banker Republicans opposed it. Bankers largely opposed the Act because of the 
presence of the Federal Reserve Board in the legislation and because only one of its seven members could represent the banking 
community. Currently, the Act is organized in 31 Sections, with some Sections having subsections (2A, 2B, 9A, 9B, 10A, 10B, 
11A, 11B, 12A, 13A, 23A, 23B, 24A, 25A, 25B, and 25C). 
4. For a history of the evolution of the Federal Reserve System see, e.g., Timberlake Jr. (1978), Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (2005), Hoenig (2006), Johnson (2010), Meltzer (2010), DiLorenzo (2011), Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City (2012), and Binder and Spindel (2013). For an introductory presentation in the form of a timeline see https://www. 
federalreserveeducation.org/ about-the-fed/history. Also, a presentation "in plain English" about the System organized by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis is available at https://www.stlouisfed.org/in-plain-english/introduction. Similar (introduc-
tory) presentations are also available at the websites of the other Federal Reserve Banks. 
5. Member banks hold stock in the Federal Reserve Banks and earn dividends. Holding this stock does not carry with it the 
control and financial interest given to holders of common stock in for-profit organizations, and the stock may not be sold or 
pledged as collateral for loans. 
6. Besides, it supervises and regulates banking institutions, and provides financial services to depository institutions, the 
U.S. government, and foreign official institutions. 
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2.2 Decentralized Structure 
 
The Federal Reserve Act rejects the concept of a single central bank, providing for a central banking 
"system" with three features: (i) a central Board of Governors, a governing body that provides general 
guidance for the System and oversees the Reserve Banks; (ii) a decentralized operating structure of 12 
Reserve Banks, and (iii) a combination of public and private characteristics.7 Within the System, certain 
responsibilities are shared between the Board of Governors and the Federal Reserve Banks (and their 
branches). While the Federal Reserve has frequent communication with the Executive branch and con-
gressional officials, its decisions are made independently.8 
 
2.3 Board of Governors 
 
The Board of Governors is an agency of the federal government that reports to and is directly account-
able to Congress. It is run by seven members, or "governors", who are nominated by the President of 
the United States and confirmed in their positions by the U.S. Senate. The Board of Governors guides 
the operation of the System to promote the goals and fulfill the responsibilities given to the Federal 
Reserve by the Federal Reserve Act.  All of the members of the Board serve on the FOMC, which is the 
body that sets monetary policy. 
 Each member of the Board is appointed for a 14-year term; the terms are staggered so that one term 
expires on January 31 of each even-numbered year. After serving a full 14-year term, a Board member 
may not be reappointed.9 The Chair and Vice Chair of the Board are also appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate, but serve only four-year terms. They may be reappointed to additional four-
year terms.10 
 The Board: (i) oversees the operations of the 12 Reserve Banks and shares with them the responsi-
bility for supervising and regulating certain financial institutions and activities; (ii) provides general 
guidance, direction, and oversight when the Reserve Banks lend to depository institutions and others 
and when the Reserve Banks provide financial services to depository institutions and the federal gov-
ernment; and (iii) has broad oversight responsibility for the operations and activities of the Federal Re-
serve Banks.11 
 
2.4 Organizational Structure 
 
The Federal Reserve Act provides that the president of a Federal Reserve Bank shall be the chief exec-
utive officer of the Bank, appointed by the board of directors of the Bank, with the approval of the Board 
of Governors, for a term of five years.12 Each of the 12 Reserve Banks is subject to the supervision of a 
                                                     
7. Although parts of the Federal Reserve System share some characteristics with private-sector organizations, the Federal 
Reserve was established to serve the public interest. 
8. The modern academic literature on central bank independence developed largely in the late 1980s and the first half of the 
1990s. By 1994, both theory and evidence suggested that more independent central banks deliver better outcomes, particularly 
lower and more stable inflation. Cukierman (2008), in his review of central bank independence, observed that "the evidence is 
consistent with the conclusion that inflation and actual [independence] are negatively related in both developed and developing 
countries." 
9. If a Board member leaves the Board before his or her term expires, however, the person nominated and confirmed to 
serve the remainder of the term may later be appointed to a full 14-year term. 
10. The nominees to these posts must already be members of the Board or must be simultaneously appointed to the Board. 
11. This authority includes oversight of the Reserve Banks’ services to depository institutions, and to the U.S. Treasury, and 
of the Reserve Banks’ examination and supervision of various financial institutions. As part of this oversight, the Board reviews 
and approves the budgets of each of the Reserve Banks. 
12. The terms of all the presidents of the 12 District Banks run concurrently, ending on the last day of February of years 
numbered 6 and 1 (e.g., 2001, 2006, and 2011). The appointment of a president who takes office after a term has begun ends 
upon the completion of that term. A president of a Reserve Bank may be reappointed after serving a full term or an incomplete 
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nine-member board of directors (Board). Six of the directors are elected by the member banks of the 
respective Federal Reserve District (District), and three of the directors are appointed by the Board of 
Governors.13 Table 1 presents some key attributes of the presidents of the Board of Governors and Dis-
tricts. 
 
Table 1. Board of Governors and District Presidents (1) 
 
Board and District Name Took office President Ph.D. economics 
Board Janet L. Yellen February 3, 2014 - 15th Yes 
1 - Boston Eric S. Rosengren July 23, 2007 - 13th; currently serv-
ing a full term that be-
gan March 1, 2011 
Yes 
2 - New York William C. Dudley January 27, 2009 - 10th Yes 
3 - Philadelphia Patrick T. Harker July 1, 2015 - 11th No - Ph.D. civil and 
urban engineering 
4 - Cleveland Loretta J. Mester June 1, 2014 - 11th Yes 
5 - Richmond Jeffrey M. Lacker August 1, 2004 - 7th; currently serving 
a full term that began 
March 1, 2011 
Yes 
6 - Atlanta Dennis P. Lockhart March 1, 2007 - 14th No - MA economics 
7 - Chicago Charles L. Evans September 1, 2007 - 9th Yes 
8 - St. Louis James Bullard April 1, 2008 - 12th; currently serv-
ing a full term that be-
gan March 1, 2011 
Yes 
9 - Minneapolis Neel Kashkari January 1, 2016 - 13th No - M.A. mechanical 
engineering and MBA 
10 - Kansas City Esther L. George October 1, 2011 - 9th No - MBA 
11 - Dallas Robert S. Kaplan September 8, 2015 - 13th No - MBA 
12 - San Francisco John C. Williams March 1, 2011 - 12th Yes 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. 
Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/banks/pres03.htm. 
 
 
3 The Federal Reserve Districts 
 
The Federal Reserve Act appointed a Reserve Bank Organization Committee (RBOC) to determine the 
number of Federal Reserve Districts (at least eight, but no more than twelve) and the location for a 
separately incorporated Reserve Bank in each District.14 After evaluating requests for Reserve Banks 
from 37 cities, the RBOC announced on April 2, 1914, the 12 Districts.15 District boundaries were based 
on prevailing trade regions that existed in 1913 and related economic considerations, so they do not 
necessarily coincide with state lines. No Reserve Bank has ever been relocated to another city, and 
except for a few minor adjustments, District boundaries remain essentially as the RBOC specified them 
in 1914.16 The Federal Reserve officially identifies Districts by number and Reserve Bank city. 
                                                     
term. Reserve Bank presidents are subject to mandatory retirement upon becoming 65 years of age. However, presidents ini-
tially appointed after age 55 can, at the option of the board of directors, be permitted to serve until attaining ten years of service 
in the office or age 75, whichever comes first. 
13. Directors have an important role in the effective functioning of the Federal Reserve. All directors are expected to partic-
ipate in the formulation of monetary policy and to act as a link between the System and the public. In addition, head-office 
directors are responsible for supervising the administration of their Reserve Bank's operations, overseeing the Reserve Bank's 
corporate governance function, and maintaining an effective system of internal auditing procedures and controls. Directors are 
not involved, however, in any matters related to banking supervision, including specific supervisory decisions. 
14. The System also serves commonwealths and territories. 
15. Wheelock (2015) is a detailed analysis of the Reserve Bank Organization Committee (RBOC) decision, and the reason 
why Missouri has two Reserve Banks. 
16. The Board of Governors revised the branch boundaries of the System in February 1996. 
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 The Federal Reserve System has adapted to changing population patterns by adding branch offices 
in the Districts. Most Reserve Banks have at least one Branch, and each Branch has its own board of 
directors. A majority of the directors on a Branch board are appointed by the Reserve Bank, and the 
remaining Branch directors are appointed by the Board of Governors. Finally, Reserve Banks conduct 
research on the regional, national, and international economies;17 prepare Reserve Bank presidents for 
their participation on the FOMC; and distribute information about the economy through publications, 
speeches, educational workshops, and websites and social media. Reserve Bank activities serve primar-
ily three audiences: bankers, the U.S. Treasury, and the public in general. The main characteristics of 
the 12Districts are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Federal Reserve Districts and Branches (1) 
 
District State Boundaries Head office Branch 
1 - Boston Massachusetts - Connecticut (excluding Fairfield 
County), Massachusetts, Maine, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont 
Boston No 
2 - New York New York - New York State, twelve counties 
in northern New Jersey, Fairfield 
County in Connecticut, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands 
New York No 
3 - Philadelphia Pennsylvania - Eastern Pennsylvania, southern 
New Jersey, and all of Delaware 
Philadelphia No 
4 - Cleveland Ohio - Ohio, western Pennsylvania, east-
ern Kentucky, and the northern 
panhandle of West Virginia 
Cleveland - Cincinnati and Pitts-
burgh 
5 - Richmond Virginia - Maryland, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, and most of 
West Virginia 
Richmond - Baltimore and Char-
lotte 
6 - Atlanta Georgia - Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and 
parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Tennessee 
Atlanta - Birmingham, Jack-
sonville, Miami, Nash-
ville, and New Orleans 
7 - Chicago Illinois - Iowa and most of Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, and Wisconsin 
Chicago - Detroit 
8 - St. Louis Missouri - Arkansas and portions of six other 
states: Missouri, Mississippi, Ten-
nessee, Kentucky, Indiana, and Illi-
nois 
St. Louis - Little Rock, Louis-
ville, and Memphis 
9 - Minneapolis Minnesota - Minnesota, Montana, North Da-
kota, South Dakota, twenty-six 
counties in northwestern Wiscon-
sin, and the Upper Peninsula of 
Michigan 
Minneapolis - Helena 
10 - Kansas City Missouri - Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Ok-
lahoma, Wyoming, northern New 
Mexico, and Western Missouri 
Kansas City - Denver, Oklahoma 
City, and Omaha 
11 - Dallas Texas - Texas, northern Louisiana, and 
southern New Mexico 
Dallas - El Paso, Houston, and 
San Antonio 
12 - San Francisco California - Nine western states--Alaska, Ari-
zona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Wash-
ington--and American Samoa, 
Guam, and the Northern Mariana 
Islands 
San Francisco - Los Angeles, Port-
land, Salt Lake City, 
and Seattle 
                                                     
17. The economists and other employees in each of the Districts work together to provide a regional perspective and expert 
knowledge about their local economies. 
  6 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. The New York Federal Reserve district is the largest by asset value. San Francisco, followed by Kansas 
City and Minneapolis, represent the largest geographical districts. Missouri is the only state to have two Federal Reserve Banks. 
California, Florida, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas are the only states which have two or more Federal 
Reserve Bank branches seated within their states, with Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee having branches of two different 
districts within the same state. In the 12th District, the Seattle Branch serves Alaska, and the San Francisco Bank serves Hawaii. 
New York, Richmond, and San Francisco are the only banks that oversee non-U.S. state territories. The System serves these 
territories as follows: The New York Bank serves the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands; the Richmond 
Bank serves the District of Columbia; the San Francisco Bank serves American Sa-moa, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands. 
Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/about.htm; https://www.richmondfed.org/faqs/frb. 
 
As originally envisioned, each of the Reserve Banks was intended to operate independently from the 
other Reserve Banks, and variation was expected in discount rates.18 The setting of a separately deter-
mined discount rate appropriate to each District was considered the most important tool of monetary 
policy at that time. The concept of economic policymaking was not well developed, and the impact of 
open market operations on policymaking was less significant.19 
 As the U.S. economy became more integrated and complex the effective conduct of monetary pol-
icy began to require increased collaboration and coordination throughout the System. This was accom-
plished in part through revisions to the Federal Reserve Act in 1933 and 1935 that together created the 
modern-day FOMC.20 The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
(Monetary Control Act) introduced an even greater degree of coordination among Reserve Banks with 
respect to the pricing of financial services offered to depository institutions.21 There has also been a 
trend among Reserve Banks to centralize or consolidate many of their financial services and support 
functions and to standardize others. Reserve Banks have become more efficient by entering into intra-
System service agreements that allocate responsibilities for services and functions that are national in 
scope among each of the Reserve Banks. 
 More recently, a major change in the operation of the Federal Reserve was proposed in the form of 
H.R. 3189 - Fed Oversight Reform and Modernization Act of 2015.22 The new legislation would: (i) 
establish requirements for policy rules, (ii) codify blackout periods of the FOMC, (iii) establish a cost-
benefit requirement for other rulemakings by the Federal Reserve Board, and (iv) establish numerous 
reporting requirements for the Federal Reserve Board and its members. One of the most revolutionary 
provisions in the bill would require the Comptroller General to audit the conduct of monetary policy by 
the Federal Reserve Board and the FOMC. In a Statement of Administration Policy, dated November 
                                                     
18. The interest rate that commercial banks were charged for borrowing funds from a Reserve Bank. 
19. This operation involves purchases and sales of U.S. government securities. 
20. The Banking Act of 1933, commonly called Glass-Steagall, was signed President Roosevelt on June 16. Among other 
things, the Act created the FDIC and separated deposit and investment banks. For the Federal Reserve, the Act reined in the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank, which had made a concerted effort to position itself as the leader of the entire Federal Reserve 
System, especially in the area of international financial dealings. The Act also created the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) (see, e.g., http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/25). 
 The Banking Act of 1935, signed by President Roosevelt on August 23, completed the restructuring of the Federal Re-
serve and financial system. The Act centralized control over the Federal Reserve System at the Board, taking away much of 
the autonomy of the regional Reserve Banks. Among other things, the Act also removed the Treasury secretary and the comp-
troller of the currency from the Board, and created the modern structure for the FOMC (see, e.g., http://www.federalreserve-
history.org/Events/DetailView/26). For details about the FOMC, including: (i) meeting calendars and information, (ii) tran-
scripts and other historical materials, and (iii) FAQs, see https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm. 
21. It was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter on March 31, 1980, as Public Law 96-221. The act has nine titles 
covering a wide range of subjects, including reserve requirements, access to and pricing of Federal Reserve services, a phase 
out of Regulation Q and new powers for thrift institutions. The two major areas of concern that the legislation addressed were: 
(i) the deregulation of institutions that accept deposits and (ii) the improvement of the control of monetary policy by the Federal 
Reserve. For details see, e.g., http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/43, and https://www.bostonfed.org/ 
about/pubs/deposito.pdf. 
22. 114th Congress (2015-2016). It passed the House. For details see https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-
bill/3189. 
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17, 2015, issued by the Executive Office of the President, the executive branch manifested its strongly 
opposition against H.R. 3189: "Subjecting the Federal Reserve's exercise of monetary policy authority 
to audits based on political whims of members of the Congress – of either party – threatens one of the 
central pillars of the Nation’s financial system and economy, and would almost certainly have negative 
impacts on the Federal Reserve's work to promote price stability and full employment." The conclusion 
of the Statement was very clear: "If the President were presented with H.R. 3189, his senior advisors 
would recommend that he veto the bill". 
 
 
4 Corporate Communication 
 
Every organization – public or private – has a corporate identity, usually understood as the core of its 
existence, made up of its history, beliefs, philosophy, technology, people, its ethical and cultural values 
and strategies.23 A clearly defined and positive corporate identity is of vital importance for success, 
growth and reputation, as the success or failure of any organization hinges on public perception. In order 
to attain that, organizations need to successfully establish good relationships with its stakeholders, which 
requires that they carefully build clear values and purposes, strategy, culture, and structure. The opinions 
of key stakeholders, such as shareholders, investors, consumers, employees, government or members of 
the community in which the organization is based, are all crucial to the long-term success of the company, 
and are usually viewed as such by executives.24 
 Corporate communication can be defined as the integrated approach to all communication produced 
by an organization, directed at relevant target groups, both internal and external. Its relevance was sum-
marized, for e.g., by Brønn (2002) in the following way: "the basic message here is that everything about 
an organization communicates. Everything. Failure to recognize this can result in serious headaches for 
organizations if they concentrate on their customer-related communications while ignoring the many 
other contact points that are not part of planned communication." 
 In today’s world of instant information access, communication must be dynamic. Using digital 
media channels for corporate communications increases the flexibility, scalability, and general retention 
of messages (and its content). Having the ability to add and change channels gives an organization the 
ability to focus its digital media where it will do the best. Digital platforms have functions that differen-
tiate them from offline platforms, in particular they are: (i) persistent, even if posts are rarely written 
with long-term archiving in mind; (ii) searchable by anyone at any time; and (iii) replicable and remix-
able with other content on other platforms. 
 As Mangini et al. (2011) observed, "the shift to digital communication has changed the way that 
people expect to find, share, and discuss information, and has opened whole new models for engagement 
and participation. People now expect to be able to receive and discover up-to-date information instantly 
online, and expect information to be live and fresh. People also expect to be able to share, rate and 
discuss content, as opposed to simply consuming it. Static websites with information that rarely changes 
are rapidly being replaced by dynamic blogging platforms where new and interesting content is added 
daily, and where social sharing and commenting is integral." 
 
4.1 Social Media 
 
Social media is a relatively recent innovation that allows for corporate communications opportunities 
that a decade ago would not have been plausible.25 For Matthews (2010), "social media is a revolutionary 
                                                     
23. Although corporate identity was originally defined in terms of the visual representation of an organization, more recent 
and broader definitions have highlighted the importance of the various forms of communication in corporate identity manage-
ment. 
24. See, e.g., Brønn (2002). 
25. For a detailed discussion about the role of social media in corporate communication see, e.g., Matthews (2010). 
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communications tool that has quickly changed the ways in which public relations is practiced, becoming 
an integral part of corporate communications for many companies and offering public relations practi-
tioners new options for every aspect of the corporate communications process." 
 In particular, social media allows companies to communicate directly and instantly with their stake-
holders, marking a shift from the traditional one-way to two-way communication.26 In other words, so-
cial media is rapidly changing the way that information is disseminated: rather than the traditional 
method of pure output – completely company-controlled messages being broadcast to the stakeholders 
– social media has forced corporate communications to shift to a dialogue in which the stakeholders, 
and not just the companies, have power over the message. Social media allows stakeholders to ask ques-
tions and have those questions answered directly by corporate executives, and for corporate executives 
to receive important feedback and even ideas from their stakeholders. 
 Social media consists of online technologies, practices or communities that individuals use to gen-
erate content and share opinions, insights, experiences and perspectives with each other, which can be 
grouped as follows: (i) the eight main social media channels (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, 
Flickr, Pinterest, Google+, and Slideshare),27 and (ii) blogs, intranets, podcasts, wikis (e.g. Wikipedia), 
videoconferencing, instant message chats, and news aggregation sites, among others. Platforms like Fa-
cebook, RSS, e-mail newsletters, blogs, Twitter, YouTube, and Google+ make it very easy for individ-
uals to register, connect, share, collaborate, and create with unprecedented power & reach. These plat-
forms have built the new tools for engagement, posing both challenges & incredible opportunities for 
organizations. In the last decade these technologies have risen in popularity among social and economic 
classes, demographic segments, and are being utilized by different organizations, in both the public and 
the private sector, to redefine the way they communicate. 
 Research conducted are revealing some interesting correlations between levels of activity in social 
media channels, among others: (i) companies engaging with social media are gaining more views and 
social interaction; (ii) on Facebook alone, companies who respond to wall posts are seeing more "Likes" 
than those who do not acknowledge; and (iii) companies tweeting 30x or more each month, averaged 
21,000 followers compared to 2,500 from those who were tweeting less. 
 Carim and Warwick (2013) analyzed the adoption of social media channels for corporate commu-
nications by UK-based research-funding organizations, and concluded that: (i) those who have adopted 
social media draw chiefly on microblogging, video-sharing and social networking sites; (ii) building a 
dialogue with stakeholders is a prime reason for using social channels, yet one-way "broadcasting" of 
information is widespread; (iii) web, media or communications/marketing teams generally manage so-
cial media channels; (iv) a minority of organizations have policies governing social media use by staff; 
and (v) social media performance is mainly measured using quantitative metrics. 
 In its review about the use of social media for corporate communications by U.S. and U.K firms, 
which is of particular interest due to its extensive coverage and as an important reference for the Federal 
Reserve System, Investis (2015) observed that: (i) an increasingly connected world and the smartphone 
revolution has meant that social media is impossible to ignore for any entity;28 (ii) the growth of social 
media over the past decade has created many new opportunities for companies; (iii) fear of negative 
commentary is one of the most commonly voiced concerns for companies hesitant about social media; 
(iv) success on one channel is not dependent on the successful use of another channel. However, engag-
ing on multiple channels increases the likelihood of content being found; and (v) inking from social 
                                                     
26. A parallel can be made with one-way and two-way networks. 
27. They can be categorized as follows: social networks (e.g. Facebook, Google+), micro-blogging (e.g. Twitter), video 
sharing (e.g. YouTube), networking sharing (e.g. LinkedIn), photo sharing (e.g. Flickr, Instagram), visual bookmarking sharing 
(e.g. Pinterest), and document sharing (e.g. Slideshare). Another typology is: (i) social network platforms (Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, Google+), (ii) content publishing platforms (YouTube, Flickr, Instagram, Pinterest, Slideshare). 
28. On every channel covered by the review, a higher percentage of US companies have an account than do the UK compa-
nies. 
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media channels to corporate websites is good. Table 3 reports some of main conclusions of the review 
for the main channels analyzed. 
 
Table 3. Use of social media for corporate communications 
 
Social media Findings 
Facebook - On average, media content is the most popular type of content on corporate Facebook accounts. IR (In-
stitutional Repository) content is the least popular corporate content to post on Facebook 
- Facebook has the largest audience of any social network, and is an excellent place for targeted content 
thanks to its apps, particularly for CSR and careers content 
- Encouraging engagement will increase a company’s reach. Emotive posts resonate particularly well on 
Facebook, as do those which seek involvement from their audience. Keep posts short, and use plenty of 
images and video 
- By replying to wall posts, even when they are negative or aggressive, it is possible both to mediate is-
sues as they arise and engage followers in a meaningful dialogue. A clear commenting policy is also 
helpful. Companies that respond to Facebook wall posts receive 17x more likes than companies that 
don’t 
YouTube - Video is an ideal format to communicate complex ideas, enabling companies to show, rather than tell, 
their ideas, stories and more 
- Users search for content as they would on a regular search engine, so proper tagging, descriptions and 
links are vital for ensuring maximum reach. Understanding how your audience discusses a given topic is 
as important as creating the video content in the first place 
- On average, media content is the most popular type of content on corporate YouTube channels with IR 
the least popular 
- Cross-population of content is a must. Sharing YouTube videos to other social channels, using seg-
ments of videos and integrating other channels into YouTube channels drives engagement 
Twitter - Companies that post IR content on Twitter have 60% more followers than companies that don’t 
- IR content is the most popular type of content on corporate Twitter accounts 
- Twitter is the most commonly linked-to social media channel from corporate websites 
- SEC and FCA guidance has had an impact on Twitter use while the influence of financial journalists, 
analysts and high-profile shareholders should not be underestimated 
- Twitter’s immediacy and its transient nature; posts are soon lost in the noise of a user’s home feed. - 
Varied and plentiful content which makes good use of images, videos and infographics helps cut through 
this 
LinkedIn - It the most commonly used channel 
- Careers content is far and away the most popular type of corporate content on LinkedIn accounts 
- It is the biggest social referrer to corporate websites 
Flickr - Images and video can be shared on Flickr but it is not a true social channel as there is little sense of its 
being a community or network 
- Flickr’s main use for corporate communications is as a repository for images, primarily designed for 
media use, or for populating websites through dynamic tagging – while Facebook is the obvious choice 
if the concern is merely to share images widely. However, other image repositories such as Pinterest and 
Instagram are now challenging Flickr 
- Media content is the most popular type of Flickr content 
Pinterest - Pinterest is the least used social platform for corporate communications and is currently used primarily 
by the bigger B2C companies 
- However, Pinterest has a notably engaged and loyal following and other companies should consider 
using it for targeted campaigns and messaging 
- The platform is one of the fastest-growing, is popular amongst an affluent and digitally savvy demo-
graphic – and may yet replace Flickr as the image repository of choice 
Google+ - Google+ is one of the big four networks in terms of membership and active user base. However, it has 
struggled to prove its relevance to corporate communications. Genuine engagement by corporates on 
Google+ is rare and average follower numbers are negligible 
- Media content is the most popular type of corporate content on Google+ accounts and IR the least pop-
ular. CSR and careers content is the most common content combination 
SlideShare - For best results, SlideShare presentations need to be embedded on the corporate site: promoting your 
SlideShare account there massively increases views and encourages exploration of your other presenta-
tions 
- IR and media content is the most popular type of SlideShare content although over a quarter of compa-
nies do post CSR content 
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Source: Investis (2015). 
 
4.2 Role of Social Media 
 
Any discussion of social media must deal with one initial, and fundamental, question: what’s its role in 
the globalization process. More specifically, (i) how do new communication technologies (in particular, 
new media channels) change societies, organizations, economies? and (ii) what is the dynamic frame-
work between traditional media, new media, organizations, their stakeholders and legitimacy? To an-
swer that it is necessary to take into account the general insights provided by many communication 
studies: (i) all individuals live in a "symbolic universe", (ii) organizations constitute in communication, 
(iii) all individuals live in a "media society", and (iv) all individuals live in a "networked society". As a 
consequence, it is possible to conclude that new communication technologies change societies, drive 
globalization and change the responsibilities of organizations. 
 In fact, it is fair to say that individuals live in a "new media society", with some specific attributes: 
(i) new communication technologies, uses and more complex communication environments influence 
the social and communicative character of stakeholders; (ii) new media channels play a crucial role for 
the (de)construction of reputation; and (iii) the internet offers other channels of communication. But, it 
is of utterly importance to notice that: (i) media do not determine effects and interpretations, and (ii) 
internet as technical institution does not determine how data is decoded in systems of signs and used, 
which information people derive from it, and how it is organized and institutionalized. Also, it is im-
portant to realize that empirical studies have a lot to say about the influence of traditional and new media 
channels on organizations and their stakeholders: even though social media influences traditional media, 
power relations are partially reproduced in new media, and social media content is taken over from 
traditional media. 
 
 
5 Dissemination of Information by the Federal Reserve System 
 
Savage (2011) called attention to the fact that despite their importance to economic stability, central 
banks did not historically communicate with most of its stakeholders: it wasn’t seen as necessary or 
even desirable, and those who needed were informed.29 This was not a matter of being deliberately se-
cretive, but of being mindful of the central bank’s position. This environment changed significantly by 
the end of the 20th century due to the innovations in communications technology, the emergence of a 
more critical media, and more demanding stakeholders. While initial efforts at greater visibility started 
during the 1980s, it was only in the 1990s that the FOMC, started issuing carefully-crafted press releases 
following its meetings, at first only when the federal funds rate changed and, since 2000, after every 
meeting. The demand for good (availability, quality, frequency) information with has grown since then. 
The manner in which stakeholders consume information is undergoing a vast transformation, and central 
banks, like organizations everywhere, must now recognize that even its immediate publics – policy-
makers, public officials, economists, bankers, CEOs, community leaders, and so forth – are not limited 
to traditional media but are increasingly likely to be getting their information via social media channels 
(in particular, Twitter, Facebook or LinkedIn). 
 Communication is critical to the success of any central bank, because it supports the bank’s policy 
objectives of maintaining price, financial stability, and full employment.30 Central banks around the 
world publish a wealth of information – economic projections, assessments of the financial system, and 
                                                     
29. See, e.g., Hanke and Morgenstern (2002), Hanke and Sekerke (2002), and Yellen (2012). 
30. The objectives vary among central banks but, in general, they have to do with protecting the value of money and promot-
ing employment. In the particular case of the Federal Reserve, the goals of monetary policy are spelled out in the Federal 
Reserve Act, which specifies that the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee should seek "to promote 
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." 
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statistics, via website, social media channels, and publications. To communicate this information – i.e. 
to not only convey it, but to impart understanding – they engage with a wide range of stakeholders, 
through formal and informal forums.31 
 The attributes of information disseminated by central banks are the same as those of any piece of 
information, conditioned only on its degree:32 (i) quality is an encompassing term comprising utility, 
objectivity, and integrity;33 (ii) objectivity involves two distinct elements of disseminated information: 
(a) presentation, that the information is presented in an accurate, clear, complete, and unbiased manner, 
and (b) substance, that the information itself is accurate, reliable, and unbiased; (iii) utility refers to the 
usefulness of the information to its intended users, including the public; (iv) integrity refers to the secu-
rity of the information – protection of the information from unauthorized access or revision – to ensure 
that the information has not been compromised through corruption or falsification; (v) reproducibility 
means that the information is capable of being substantially reproduced, subject to an acceptable degree 
of imprecision;34 (vi) influenceability, means that the sender of the information can reasonably deter-
mine that its dissemination does have or will have a clear and substantial impact on important public 
policies or important private-sector decisions; and (vii) transparency requires to disclose specific data 
sources that have been used and the specific quantitative methods and assumptions that have been em-
ployed in order for an independent re-analysis to be undertaken. Besides these, two other attributes are 
also very significant: (i) frequency refers to the number of occurrences of a repeating event, in this case, 
the dissemination of information, per unit time; and (ii) availability is the proportion of time a particular 
information is in a functioning condition, that is, is easily retrievable. 
 Central banks and monetary authorities use a range of approaches to communicate, from quite min-
imal and closed, through to publishing minutes that contain dissenting views, and they achieve a range 
of differing results. For example, during periods of the global financial crisis dissenting voices from the 
United States’ FOMC, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, the Executive Board of the 
Riksbank, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Central Bank of Brazil, and the Monetary Policy Meet-
ing of the Reserve Bank of Australia Board, created some confusion in financial markets and some 
investors suggested it undermined credibility. 
 The Federal Reserve System plays a significant role in the public dissemination of economic and 
financial information to its stakeholders. This information covers an array of subjects with varying de-
grees of importance and impact on monetary and public policy and economic conditions. Different com-
munication platforms are used to accomplish the dissemination strategy, but the Federal Reserve Board 
relies exclusively on electronic means (mostly the internet) to disseminate regularly released statistical 
data.35 One of the most important source of data is the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) system 
developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, which contains 390,685 U.S. and international time 
series, from 79 sources.36 
 
 
                                                     
31. For technical discussions about communication of monetary policy see, e.g., Issing (2005), Woodford (2005), Blinder et 
al. (2008), Kedan e Stuart (2014), and Hansen and McMahon (2016a, 2016b). 
32. These definitions are taken directly from the OMB guidelines, published in the Federal Register on February 22, 2002 
(67 FR 8451-8460). 
33. Therefore, the guidelines sometimes refer to these terms collectively as "quality". 
34. For data deemed to be "influential" (as defined above), the degree of imprecision is lower than for data deemed non-
influential. 
35. Paper copies of the Statistical Supplement to the Federal Reserve Bulletin and the standard statistical releases were dis-
continued entirely several years ago. 
36. FRED is much more than a plotting and downloading tool. For example, its application programming interface (API) has 
been made widely available and there are now specific applications to interface with it from statistical software such as R, 
STATA, MatLab, and Eviews as well as applications for Apple and Android based smartphones. Importantly, FRED’s cata-
loguing structure has moved from being just "category based" to including "tags". This makes it much easier to find series that 
are related along several dimensions. See, https://fred.stlouisfed.org. Number of time series and sources as of July 31, 2016. 
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5.1 Guidelines 
 
On February 22, 2002, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidelines requiring federal 
agencies to develop procedures for reviewing and substantiating the quality of their information before 
it is disseminated to its stakeholders.37 These quality guidelines become effective October 1, 2002, and 
cover information disseminated on or after that date, regardless of when the information was first dis-
seminated.38 The guidelines also require that each agency create a mechanism by which affected persons 
may seek, and when appropriate obtain, correction of information that the agency disseminates and that 
does not comply with agency and OMB guidelines.39 
 Some examples of information disseminated by the Board covered by the guidelines are: (i) statis-
tical releases; (ii) testimonies, speeches, and reports on various economic and banking topics, by staff 
designated to communicate official Board positions, simultaneously disseminated to the public; (iii) 
periodicals and journal articles on various economic and banking topics; (iv) research and staff studies 
initiated and sponsored by the Board; (v) educational consumer brochures, booklets, and pamphlets. 
Some examples of information disseminated by the Board not covered by the guidelines are: (i) press 
releases (if the attached information was previously released to the public); (ii) Federal Reserve proce-
dural manuals; (iii) research and staff studies not initiated and sponsored by the Board. 
 The Federal Reserve Board announced the availability of guidelines for the public entitled "Ensur-
ing and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by the 
Federal Reserve".40 The Board has created these guidelines to present its standards and to formalize its 
correction mechanism, and it is the Board’s intent to meet the information-quality standards set forth in 
these guidelines.41 According to the Board, it takes pride in the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity 
of the information that it disseminates to the public, and as a consequence, before any information is 
released, it is thoroughly edited and reviewed.42 
 It is an undisputable fact that the Board will continue to disseminate information that meets the 
agency’s already highly rigorous internal review and approval process. The Board’s current policies and 
procedures ensure that, to the best of its ability, it releases to its stakeholders information (including 
data) that is accurate and timely, appropriate for external consumption, uncompromised, and useful. 
 
5.2 Transparency 
 
Transparency is the foundation upon which both accountability and participation are built. Transparency 
and access to information is the first step to allow stakeholders to engage in dialogue, independent mon-
itoring, and public oversight.43 In particular, transparency is the watchword for monetary policy, and 
                                                     
37. The OMB guidelines were issued pursuant to the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
2001 (Public Law 106-554, section 515). 
38. Some previously disseminated information which continues to be used for decision making or is relied upon by the 
agency and the public as official, authoritative government data is, in effect, constantly being re-disseminated and is thus subject 
to the guidelines. Previously released information that does not meet these criteria is considered archived information and thus 
is not subject to these guidelines. 
39. For details see https://www.federalreserve.gov/iq_guidelines.htm. 
40. The guidelines can be found on the Federal Reserve Board’s web site. According to the Board the document is intended 
to provide guidance to the public on the procedures the agency has in place for reviewing and substantiating the quality of the 
information that is disseminated. The guidelines also provide a mechanism for affected individuals to provide complaints to 
the agency. The Federal Reserve’s guidelines are being issued pursuant to the Treasury and General Government Appropria-
tions Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-554, Section 515). 
41. While covering a broad range of information, these guidelines focus mainly on the statistical and financial data and 
information that the Board disseminates. 
42. Federal Reserve Bank (2011) sets the framework on external communications of Federal Reserve System Staff for the 
FOMC. 
43. For the World Bank, for e.g., "[…] transparency requires that the state is willing and able to share information with the 
public. This information should be presented in a manner that allows citizens to engage. A country’s existing legal framework 
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greater openness the hallmark of the modern central bank.44 Any central bank – independently of juris-
diction, geographic location, size, and policy objectives – should consider three rationales for transpar-
ency in its communication, especially in relation to price and financial stability: (i) to demonstrate ac-
countability for its significant autonomy or independence in pursuing policy objectives; (ii) to promote 
understanding, so as to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of policy; and (iii) to use communica-
tion to signal its intended action, so informing and shaping expectations of policy actions. 
 Transparency of monetary policy can be deﬁned as the extent to which central banks disclose in-
formation that is related to the policymaking process.45 It is a multifaceted concept that could pertain to 
any aspect of economic policy-making. Thus, it seems natural to use a conceptual framework for trans-
parency that reﬂects the different stages of the decision-making process. Following Geraats (2000), one 
can distinguish ﬁve aspects of transparency: political, economic, procedural, policy and operational 
transparency. Each of these aspects may give rise to different motives for transparency. Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006) concluded that central bank transparency has become the topic of a lively public and 
academic debate on monetary policy. However, this has been complicated by the fact that transparency 
is a qualitative concept that is hard to measure. They propose an index for the transparency of monetary 
policy that comprises the political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of central bank-
ing. The index is compiled for nine major central banks, and is based on a detailed analysis of actual 
information disclosure and reveals a rich variety in the degree and dynamics of central bank transparency. 
 Nevertheless, as observed by Hannah (2015),46 there is an apparent paradox related to the dissemi-
nation of information by a central bank: the more the bank exposes to stakeholders the details of complex 
issues, and on the internal discussions on risks and uncertainties, the more the bank opens itself up to 
the risk of perceptions that the management of the issue by the bank is not as solid as stakeholders 
assumed. Credibility and effectiveness of policy may appear at risk. Increasingly, however, central 
banks throughout the world have come to appreciate the value of transparency, as a way of increasing 
the effectiveness of policy. The more stakeholders understand their policy choices, the more likely they 
are to anticipate the banks’ decisions, minimizing the chances of poor economic and financial decisions. 
 Different degrees of transparency are appropriate for different stakeholders – and every central 
bank need to seek to strike the right balance between transparency, stability, and continuity in its en-
gagement with stakeholders. Improving the understanding of their stakeholders and specific behaviors 
helps the bank to better gauge what level of transparency best supports credibility and achieves the 
policy objectives that they seek. While there are reasons for differing levels of transparency stakeholders, 
the central bank should always look for opportunities to educate audiences to enhance their understand-
ing of policy, including the inherent uncertainties in its conduct. 
                                                     
(such as an Access to Information Law) can provide crucial support for transparency. After the information is disclosed and 
demystified, it should be widely disseminated and made accessible. Citizens and other key stakeholders can then use this 
information to engage in a dialogue with the government, service providers, and other national and international entities. […]. 
The four dimensions of promoting transparency & information are as follows: (1) Disclosure of information: the act of disclos-
ing information and the level of government transparency regarding public budgets, expenditures, programs, and so forth; (2) 
Demystification of information: raising awareness and understanding of citizens by simplifying information – for example, 
about laws, rights, budgets, and policies; (3) Dissemination of information: publicizing information related to, for example, 
governance issues, processes, finances, and laws; (4) Discussion of information and feedback: engaging in discussion of infor-
mation and providing feedback to government." For more details, see https://saeguide.worldbank.org/transparency-infor-
mation-information-disclosure-dissemination-and-demystification. 
44. The Bank of England was an early pioneer in the pursuit of transparency. In 1993, the institution became the first among 
its peers to publish an inflation report. The Bank renewed its transparency efforts after it was granted operational independence 
from Her Majesty’s Government in 1997. The newly created Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is determined to build a 
strong public constituency in support of its price stability mandate and for that transparency is a key issue. The same applies 
for other central banks, in particular, those who have adopted and inflation targeting regime, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
45 For a discussion on the role of transparency see, e.g., Demertzis and Hallett (2007), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007), 
Nishkin (2007), and Dincer and Eichengreen (2009, 2014). 
46. The case, per se, concerns the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Nevertheless, its conclusions are easily generalized. 
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 McGregor (2007) argued that the calculus of electoral politics and the central bank’s bureaucratic 
objectives can explain the recent trend toward greater Federal Reserve System transparency and can 
shed light on the likelihood that this trend will continue. If incumbent politicians see no electoral ad-
vantage in pressuring the System to become still more transparent, and if the System sees no benefit to 
greater transparency, then further changes in current practice are unlikely. Private sector agents will 
continue to face a significant degree of uncertainty about the System’s policy objectives and about the 
information that policymakers consider in the monetary policy decision process. 
 The Federal Reserve considers transparency about the goals, conduct, and stance of monetary pol-
icy to be fundamental to the effectiveness of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve Act sets forth the 
goals of monetary policy, specifically "to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." Financial stability is an important prerequisite for achiev-
ing these goals. Transparency about monetary policy also helps promote the accountability of the Fed-
eral Reserve to the Congress and the public. Such accountability is especially critical when nontradi-
tional policy tools – which are less familiar to the public than traditional policy tools – are employed. 
 The Federal Reserve System has taken a series of efforts in recent years to enhance transparency 
of monetary policy.47 Some of the initiatives include:48 (i) the issuance by the FOMC of a statement 
announcing and explaining its monetary policy decision immediately after each of its meetings, as well 
as periodic additional statements on its longer-run policy goals and strategies and policy normalization 
principles and plans;49 (ii) the FOMC's release of detailed minutes of its meetings three weeks after each 
meeting, which provide a timely summary of significant policy issues addressed by meeting partici-
pants;50 (iii) the FOMC’s publication of quarterly summaries of policymakers’ economic forecasts; (iv) 
the quarterly press conference by the Chair following certain FOMC meetings; (v) pursuant to the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the issuance of regular reports to the Congress on each of 
its lending programs that relied on its authorities under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act; (vi) 
the publication of a periodic report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet; and (vii) 
the implementation of new disclosure requirements pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010. 
 Savage (2011) discussed "[…] a series of steps to break down the barriers to transparency […]".51 
First, he notices that "[…] each Reserve Bank […] has, by design, its own communications approach 
that reflects the geographical regions of the United States as well as the independent perspectives con-
tributed by this uniquely “decentralized central bank”." Second, Savage points some of the initiatives 
undertaken by the Bank: (i) adapting the Bank’s research into everyday language and accessible terms; 
                                                     
47. In addition, the Federal Reserve System – as an agency of the United States Government, operates under the terms of 
The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended by Public Law n° 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, and Public Law n° 
111-83, § 564, 123 Stat. 2142, 2184. The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 (E-FOIA) stated that 
all agencies are required by statute to make certain types of records, created by the agency on or after November 1, 1996, 
available electronically. Agencies must also provide electronic reading rooms for citizens to use to have access to records. 
Given the large volume of records and limited resources, the amendment also extended the agencies' required response time to 
FOIA requests. For more detail see http://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/about_foia.htm. 
48. See https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm. 
49. The FOMC first announced the outcome of a meeting in February 1994. After making several further post-meeting state-
ments in 1994, the Committee formally announced in February 1995 that all changes in the stance of monetary policy would 
be immediately communicated to the public. In January 2000, the Committee announced that it would issue a statement fol-
lowing each regularly scheduled meeting, regardless of whether there had been a change in monetary policy (See 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_historical.htm). 
50. The minutes record all decisions taken by the Committee with respect to these policy issues and explain the reasoning 
behind these decisions. From their emergence in their present form in February 1993 until December 2004, the minutes were 
published approximately three days after the Committee's subsequent meeting. In December 2004, the Committee decided to 
expedite the release of its minutes. Since then, the minutes have been made available to the public three weeks after the date of 
the policy decision, thus reducing the lag in their release by an average of about three weeks (See https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_historical.htm). 
51. The discussion focused the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, but are easily generalized. 
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(ii) putting videos on YouTube as an important part of the Bank’s educational and financial literacy 
outreach program; (iii) introducing a new print and online multimedia policy journal (Forefront); and 
(iv) migrating the website from a "traditional" (the 1990s) to a versatile modern-day platform. His con-
clusion is that "this three-pronged communications strategy – general public, informed public, knowl-
edgeable stakeholders/experts – ensures that the FRBC will be able address today’s communications 
challenges and the growing expectations of what has come to be called an era of “radical transparency”." 
 
5.3 Reputational Risk 
 
Corporate reputation is one of the most valuable asset of any organization. Although an intangible asset 
it is broadly publicized and protected. Any central bank has an interest in maintaining a high reputation 
– not a self-serving, "public relations" reputation, but a reputation for certain qualities, for example 
credibility, consistency and clarity in its communications.52 This is needed to build understanding of its 
policy measures and signals, and help deliver its policy objectives. 
 In his analysis Vardy (2015) concluded that reputation management has become increasingly im-
portant for central banks for a number of reasons: (i) around the world, they have taken on greater policy 
roles since the global financial crisis; (ii) in many countries, the burden to stimulate economic growth 
has largely fallen on the monetary authority; and (iii) some central banks have assumed new or expanded 
mandates to regulate financial institutions and engage in macro prudential regulation. As a consequence, 
"these more visible, wide-ranging and critical roles for central banks have raised their profile and placed 
them under intense scrutiny, with particular focus on their transparency and accountability". 
 According to Warrin et al. (2013), social media is a formidable platform to publicize a firm’s brand 
and improve its reputation. Nevertheless, there are risks, in particular, the spread at an unprecedented 
speed and scale of information, independently of being true or false. They propose a game theoretic 
model, with finite and infinite horizon, to evaluate the impact of social media on a firm’s reputation. 
The model also highlights the important parameters of a firm’s reputation in the digital era. 
 
5.4 Communication 
 
Historically central banks have been given more autonomy. They were, and still are, trusted to do the 
right thing. Yet today, it is more important than ever they understand how they are perceived by their 
stakeholders, how their "brand" can be a driver of behaviour, and how to influence that perception. 
Central banks are, in this regard, increasingly behaving like commercial entity, as they strive to project 
one coherent identity across their public interaction. 
 There was a time in the not too distant past when central banks, and central bankers, prided them-
selves on their "constructive ambiguity". Should that fail, there was always impenetrable jargon, the old 
standby, to fall back on. No longer. Central banks today have to make themselves easier to understand. 
But turning technical terms into "plain" language is far from straight-forward and the risk of confusion 
must be weighed against the risk of oversimplification. 
 From managing the public’s expectations to influencing financial markets, what central banks say 
and how they say it have rarely mattered more. As a result, communications professionals face a number 
of seemingly incompatible goals. They must be seen to be forwarding thinking yet maintain a sense of 
responsibility for the present. They must be seen to be open yet protect sensitive information. They must 
have complete faith in their decisions yet accept they will subject to intense scrutiny, well after the fact. 
 Communication is an essential element of central bank policy making, for which financial stability 
and inflation reports are key tools. As central banks are handed more responsibilities,53 especially after 
                                                     
52. For a detailed analysis of reputational risk management in central banks see, e.g., Vardi (2015). 
53. One of the key realizations after the financial crisis was that public authorities should do more to promote financial 
inclusion and education. Today, central banks realize they have a key role to play in developing a new culture on broad financial 
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the financial crisis started in 2007, they must learn to communicate effectively about new targets, tools 
and decision-making processes. How can internal communication departments convey both simultane-
ously – ensuring one does not conflict with the other? Also, with greater demands for transparency, how 
do they ensure the release of the right information, at the right time, and to right stakeholder? 
 Central bank communication has increased significantly over the past two decades. For Vayid 
(2013), financial markets scrutinize central bank communications for "clues and shades of meaning 
about its assessment of the economy and the direction of where economic policy may be heading". 
 Central banks regularly communicate about financial stability issues, by publishing Financial Sta-
bility Reports (FSRs) and through press releases, speeches, interviews and research. Born et al. (2011), 
building upon a unique dataset of more than 1000 releases of FSRs and speeches by 37 central banks 
over the past 14 years, concluded that "the findings suggest that financial stability communication by 
central banks are perceived by markets to contain relevant information, and they underline the im-
portance of differentiating between communication tools, their content and the environment in which 
they are employed." 
 Effective communications enhance a central bank’s public transparency, accountability and credi-
bility (Carney (2010)), which in turn aids its ability to implement economic policies. Fay and Gravelle 
(2010) analyzed the impact of different types of communications (press releases, speeches, interviews, 
and news conferences) to determine which media sources impact interest rate expectations.54 
 In 2014, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand conducted an External Stakeholder Engagement Survey 
to assess the levels of engagement with stakeholders and to help identify how to improve its communi-
cations.55 The survey applied a framework to assess the Bank’s reputation across each of its key stake-
holder groups,56 based on: (i) familiarity, the extent to which the Reserve Bank is familiar to stakeholders 
in terms of activities, benefits, values, mission; (ii) favorability, the extent to which the Reserve Bank is 
viewed positively; (iii) trust, ultimately trust underpins reputation; without trust, messages are rejected. 
build trust and you build support, your messages are better received, and ultimately you create advocates; 
and (iv) advocacy, the extent to which stakeholders will actively speak highly or critically of the Reserve 
Bank. 
 
 
6 Forms of Dissemination 
 
As any other entity the Federal Reserve System uses alternative forms to disseminate information to its 
stakeholders. More than that, there is a wide spectrum of social media channels used by the Board of 
Governors and the Federal Reserve Banks. To make effective use of social media, central banks need to 
not only understand the best way of using the different channels within their wider communications 
framework to harness interaction, but also consider how they can best use the information gathered from 
social media posts by stakeholders to monitor reactions and reception to policies. It is also important for 
central banks to understand the image they portray both from the followers they have, but also who they 
are following.57 
 
  
                                                     
and economic matters. 
54. To date, there has been little research into text mining of central bank communications. 
55. The report is available as an annex to Hannah (2015), entitled "Reserve Bank of New Zealand External Stakeholder 
Engagement - Key Findings Report". 
56. The stakeholders considered were: (i) public, (ii) media, (iii) business, (iv) regulated industries, (v) markets, (vi) educa-
tors/researchers, and (vii) government. 
57. Yet social media are resource and time intensive, and demand skills which may be in short supply in central banks. 
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6.1 Website 
 
Websites act as a vital information hub where stakeholders, the general public and banking professionals, 
in particular, can find out about their central bank.58 They create a window into the central bank and in 
recent times have adapted to allow easy reading and navigation across different viewing platforms, in-
cluding smartphone and tablet screens. As depositaries of works over the years, they contain announce-
ments, speeches, data and research. The best provide a wealth of information covering the central bank’s 
past decisions, present conflicts and future expectations, striking a good balance between providing de-
tailed and digestible content. 
 The website is the usual form of information dissemination used by the Federal Reserve System, 
with a great variety of quality.59 Worldwide, there is a noticeable trend in the use of websites by central 
banks. In fact, when the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) launched its site in September 1996, 
its list of "Central Banks on the World Wide Web" contained only 10 names: Austria, Brazil,60 Canada, 
Estonia, Hong Kong, India, Mexico, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Cur-
rently, the site references 178 central banks.61 Courtis (1998), in his analysis of central banks on the 
internet observed that: (i) since 1996 over 80 of the world’s 172 (at that time) central banks have estab-
lished websites on the Internet; (ii) many central bank sites look outdated and dog-eared; and (iii) many 
central bankers are missing an opportunity. 
 Website design is about both "form and content", and to excel it is necessary to understand what 
the stakeholders think.62 Friedman (2008) summarized, very clearly what is fundamental:63 (i) they ap-
preciate quality and credibility, (ii) they don’t read, they scan, (iii) they are impatient and insist on instant 
gratification, (iv) they don’t make optimal choices, (v) they follow their intuition, (vi) they want to have 
control. His conclusion? "Usability and the utility, not the visual design, determine the success or failure 
of a web-site. Since the visitor of the page is the only person who clicks the mouse and therefore decides 
everything, user-centric design has become a standard approach for successful and profit-oriented web 
design. After all, if users can’t use a feature, it might as well not exist." Table 4 presents a sample of 
guidelines and/or principles for best website design which can be used to rank the websites of the Federal 
Reserve System.64 
 
  
                                                     
58. For a general discussion about information dissemination through official websites see, e.g., Bhattacharya (2010). He 
argues that with the proliferation of official websites worldwide, data dissemination concepts as developed by the IMF need to 
be generalized towards information dissemination, with special reference to web-based dissemination. His analysis reveals that 
some degree of convergence has taken place among all official websites in: (i) structuring the contents, and in (ii) providing a 
few basic facilities to the users. Nevertheless, Bhattacharya notices that none of the sites are fully compliant with respect to the 
criteria specified in the paper. For a general analysis of websites used by central banks see Courtis (1998); for the particular 
case of the Bank of Canada, see Eades (2001). 
59. In this case, quality defined in terms of the following attributes: (i) simplicity, (ii) visual hierarchy, (iii) navigability, (iv) 
accessibility, (v) spacing, (vi) typography, (vii) alignment, and (viii) clarity. 
60. Even though it was one of the pioneers, the website of the Central Bank of Brazil currently is one of the most outdated 
in a sample of major central banks’ websites. 
61. See https://www.bis.org/cbanks.htm. There is another list available at http://www.theibns.org/joomla/index.php?op-
tion=com_content&view=article&id=139&Itemid=139. 
62. The construction of websites has been extensively discussed, from both a theoretical and practical point of view. There 
are many references about website design in the web itself (see e.g., http://www.webstyleguide.com, by Patrick J. Lynch and 
Sarah Horton). In general, it is difficult to characterize a "good" website, and most characterization can be debated. Never the 
less the two fundamental criteria for evaluation involve form and content. 
63. See https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2008/01/10-principles-of-effective-web-design/. 
64. The list is not exhaustive. There are hundreds of references to best practices in website design but the ones cited are very 
much representative of the major issues. 
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Table 4. Guideline and/or principles for website design 
 
Author Guideline and/or principles 
Hubspot -  Erik Deva-
ney (1) 
- 1) simplicity, 2) visual hierarchy, 3) navigability, 4) consistency, 5) accessibility, 6) convention-
ality, 7) credibility, 8) user centricity 
Envatotuts+ - Collis 
Ta’eed (2) 
- 1) precedence (guide the eye), 2) spacing, 3) navigation, 4) design to build, 5) typography, 6) us-
ability, 7) alignment, 8) clarity (sharpness), 9) consistency 
Smashing Maganize - 
Vitaly Friedman (3) 
- 1) don’t make users think, 2) don’t squander users’ patience, 3) manage to focus users’ attention, 
4) strive for feature exposure, 5) make use of effective writing, 6) strive for simplicity, 7) don’t be 
afraid of the white space, 8) communicate effectively with a “visible language”, 9) conventions are 
our friends, 10) test early, test often 
Source: (1) http://blog.hubspot.com/blog/tabid/6307/bid/30557/6-Guidelines-for-Exceptional-Website-Design-and-Usability. 
aspx#sm.000145u6xtmf5e6trce2lyh1frqtz; (2) http://design.tutsplus.com/tutorials/9-essential-principles-for-good-web-design-
-psd-56; (3) https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2008/01/10-principles-of-effective-web-design. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the main content of each website of the Federal Reserve System.65 
 
Table 5. Website content (1) 
 
Board and District Head Content Search 
Board - what’s new, what is 
next, site map, A-Z 
index, careers, RSS, 
all videos, current 
FAQs, contact us 
- about the Fed, news & events, monetary policy, banking 
information & regulation, payment systems, economic re-
search & data, consumer information, community develop-
ment, reporting forms, publications 
Yes 
1 - Boston (2) - publications & data, 
news & events, ca-
reers, about us 
- monetary policy & economic research, supervision & 
credit, payments studies & strategy, community develop-
ment, in the region 
Yes 
2 - New York - museum & gold 
tour, data & statistics, 
careers, blog, press 
center 
- about the New York Fed, markets & policy implementa-
tion, economic research, financial institution supervision, 
financial services & infrastructure, outreach & education 
Yes 
3 - Philadelphia - home, about the 
Fed, contact, FAQs, 
site map, follow the 
Fed 
- research & data, education, consumer credit & payments, 
bank resources, community development, newsroom, ca-
reers, publications 
Yes 
4 - Cleveland - contact us, careers, 
FAQs, links to social 
media 
- our research, community development, banking over-
sight, newsroom and events, about us, learning center and 
money museum 
Yes 
5 - Richmond - conferences & 
events, careers 
- research, banking, education, community development, 
press room, publications, about us 
Yes 
6 - Atlanta - careers, contact us, 
A to Z index, follow 
the Fed, publications, 
home 
- research and data, economy matters, banking, news and 
events, education, community development, about the Fed 
Yes 
7 - Chicago - about us, contact us, 
newsroom, museum, 
subscribe, careers 
- banking, research, markets, publications, events, educa-
tion, region, people 
Yes 
8 - St. Louis No - featured topic, research and data, from the president, 
blogs, publications, economic education, community de-
velopment, bank supervision, about us 
Yes 
9 - Minneapolis - home, careers, con-
tact 
- about the Fed, banking supervision, economic research, 
regional economy, community & education, news & 
events, publications 
Yes 
                                                     
65. For educational purposes, most central banks host visits, and publish educational information for students and the general 
public with different levels of proficiency in economics and finance. This is a major topic in all websites of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
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10 - Kansas City No - banking, research & data, community development, 
newsroom, publications, education, about us, links to social 
media 
Yes 
11 - Dallas - about the Fed, con-
tact us, FAQs, ca-
reers, news, events 
- research & data, banking, community development, eco-
nomic education, globalization institute, publications, fol-
low the Fed 
Yes 
12 - San Francisco 
(3) 
No - home, research, banking, education, community develop-
ment, cash, our district, the Fed System 
Yes 
(1) As of July 31, 2016; (2) On July 30, 2016, the Bank introduced a new design for its website. This website and the one for 
the San Francisco Bank are the best in the Federal Reserve System; (3) This website is equal to none of the others in terms of 
form. It has only a "menu" with links to content. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites: Board (federalreserve.org), 1 - Boston (bostonfed.org), 2 - New York (newyork-
fed.org), 3 - Philadelphia (philadelphiafed.org), 4 - Cleveland (clevelandfed.org), 5 - Richmond (richmondfed.org), 6 - Atlanta 
(frbatlanta.org), 7 - Chicago (chicagofed.org), 8 - St. Louis (stlouisfed.org), 9 - Minneapolis (minneapolisfed.org), 10 - Kansas 
City (kansascityfed.org), 11 - Dallas (dallasfed.org), 12 - San Francisco (frbsf.org). 
 
A qualitative assessment of some major central banks throughout the world, based on the above guide-
lines and/or principles for website design, results in the following ranking:66 (i) European Central Bank 
(ECB), (ii) The Central Bank of Iceland, (iii) Norges Bank, (iv) De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), (v) 
Bank of Canada, (vi) Bank for International Settlements (BIS), (vii) International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
(viii) The World Bank (WB), (ix) Banque de France, and (x) Deutsche Bundesbank. The first three are 
outstanding websites, following the best practices. In the Federal Reserve System, the only Banks which 
would rank on the top two are the San Francisco Bank, and the Boston Bank (followed by the Richmond 
Bank and New York Bank). The Boston Bank drastically improved its website on July 30, 2016, intro-
ducing an extremely "clean and modern look". There is an immense gap in website form and content 
among Banks in the Federal Reserve System, especially in terms of form, which is essential to the vis-
iting stakeholder. Table 6 summarizes the evaluation. 
 
Table 6 - Ranking of websites (1) 
 
Board and District (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) Total 
Board Poor Poor Poor Poor Fair Good Poor Poor Poor 
1 - Boston Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ 
2 - New York Good Fair Good Good Fair Fair Fair Good Good 
3 - Philadelphia Fair Poor Fair Good Poor Poor Fair Good Fair 
4 - Cleveland Good Fair Fair Good Good Poor Poor Good Fair 
5 - Richmond Good Good Good Good Good Fair Good Good Good 
6 - Atlanta Fair Poor Fair Good Poor Poor Poor Good Fair 
7 - Chicago Fair Poor Fair Good Poor Poor Fair Good Fair 
8 - St. Louis Fair Poor Fair Good Poor Poor Fair Good Fair 
9 - Minneapolis Fair Poor Fair Good Poor Poor Fair Good Fair 
10 - Kansas City Fair Poor Fair Good Poor Poor Fair Good Fair 
11 - Dallas Fair Poor Fair Good Poor Poor Poor Good Poor 
12 - San Francisco Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ Good+ 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. (A) Simplicity; (B) Visual hierarchy; (C) Navigability; (D) Accessibility; (E) Spacing; (F) Typography; 
(G) Alignment; and (H) Clarity. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites.  
 
Table 7 details the availability of platforms for dissemination of information by the Federal Reserve 
System. They all adopt the same general structure of alternatives, but with significant differences in 
accessibility, availability, and quality. There are many options to improve the current offerings in these 
                                                     
66. See: (i) https://www.ecb.europa.eu, (ii) http://www.cb.is, (iii) http://www.norges-bank.no (iv) http://www.dnb.nl, (v) 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca, (vi) http://www.bis.org, (vii) http://www.imf.org, (viii) http://www.worldbank.org, (ix) 
https://www.banque-france.fr, and (x) https://www.bundesbank.de. A significant change in both form and content of the ECB, 
BIS and IMF websites was completed very recently (actually, in the case of the IMF the change is still under way). 
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three attributes when one takes into account not only the best practice within the System but also that 
adopt by central banks in other jurisdictions, and even organizations in the private sector. 
 
Table 6. Website content and dissemination of information (1) 
 
Board and District RSS Email Podcasts Blog Social media (2) Videos (3) Speeches (4) 
Board Yes Yes No No Yes - 4 Yes Yes 
1 - Boston Yes No Yes (5) No Yes - 3 Yes Yes 
2 - New York Yes Yes No Yes (6) Yes - 4 No Yes 
3 - Philadelphia Yes Yes No No Yes - 4 Yes (7) Yes 
4 - Cleveland No Yes (8) No No Yes - 6 Yes Yes 
5 - Richmond No No Yes (9) No (10) Yes - 3 Yes (11) Yes 
6 - Atlanta Yes Yes Yes Yes (12) Yes - 4 Yes (13) Yes 
7 - Chicago Yes Yes (14) No Yes (15) Yes - 3 Yes Yes 
8 - St. Louis Yes (16) Yes (17) No Yes (18) Yes - 7 Yes Yes 
9 - Minneapolis Yes No No Yes (19) Yes - 3 Yes Yes 
10 - Kansas City Yes Yes Yes (20) No Yes - 4 Yes (21) Yes 
11 - Dallas Yes Yes No No Yes - 4 Yes (22) Yes 
12 - San Francisco Yes (23) Yes (24) No Yes (25) Yes - 3 (26) Yes (27) Yes 
(1) As of July 31, 2016; (2) The number indicates the links to social media; (3) Videos are, in general, about the speeches in 
events; (4) It also includes testimonies; (5) Boston has a link to other Fed’s podcasts. Actually, there are broken links to the 
New York Bank, the Dallas Bank and the Minneapolis Bank, which have no podcast; (6) Liberty Street Economics is available 
on the iPad and can be customized by economic research topic or economist; (7) Only two, educational; (8) Not on the front 
page; difficult to locate in website; (9) Need to search; difficult to locate in website; (10) Economic Brief are web-exclusive 
essays on current economic issues and trends based on staff economists' ongoing research and published work. The search for 
"blog" returns links to this page, but actually it is not a blog in the strict sense of the term; (11) The best content, also in terms 
of organization by type; (12) Located under "research & data"; not on front page; (13) Located under "conference & events", 
under "news & events"; not on front page; (14) Located under "contact us"; not on front page; (15) Located under "education" 
on a sidebar named "resources"; very difficult to locate; not on front page; (16) Located under "contact us"; on front page it is 
necessary to "expand footer" to see the links; (17) Located under "contact us"; on front page it is necessary to "expand footer" 
to see the links; (18) There are actually two blogs: "On the Economy" and "FRED"; (19) There is a blog under the "Center for 
Indian Country Development"; not on front page; (20) Need to "search" the site; not on front page; (21) Need to "search" the 
site; not on front page; (22) Need to "search" the site; not on front page; very poor quality; (23) Under "subscriptions"; not on 
front page; (24) Under "subscriptions"; not on front page; (25) Under "subscriptions" there is a broken link to "community 
development blog"; (26) Under "contact us"; not on front page; (27) Need to "search" the site; not on front page; excellent 
quality. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites. 
 
In general, the Reserve Banks offer a "full package " of dissemination channels, which includes RSS,67 
email, podcasts, blogs, social media, videos, and speeches. In each case RSS offers a rich portfolio of 
information to the stakeholders in a very simple format, and allow the users to choose from it. In the 
case of email most Banks also allow the choice of information to be received, such as news releases, 
research publications, speeches, videos, events, and community development. The use of podcasts and 
blogs are less usual: only four Banks communicate via podcasts, and six use blogs. 
 All of the Reserve Banks use social media channels, usually three or four, with the Cleveland Bank 
as an exception with six channels. In general, the channels are listed on the front page of the website, 
but usually with very little emphasis; in some cases, the user needs to "scroll down" a page to locate the 
channels, and in others it is necessary to link to another page. Also, some websites show inconsistency 
when referencing the social media options among webpages. 
                                                     
67. RSS, or "Really Simple Syndication" is an XML-based format for distributing web content. Users can subscribe to RSS 
feeds using software such as readers, or aggregators, which display the links, headlines, and a brief summary of the feed. The 
reader automatically incorporates changes for RSS subscribers when content in the feed has been updated or changed. 
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 In the case of videos there is a significant discrepancy among Federal Reserve Banks concerning 
availability, quality (a major problem in most Banks), and topics presented. All, except the San Fran-
cisco Bank have direct links to YouTube and usually there is a difference between the content in the 
website and in YouTube. Most videos are speeches by senior officers and presentations made in events. 
 Finally, all Reserve Banks make available speeches by senior officers, usually within the United 
States. A minority are delivered on-the-record to enable the bank to publicly convey specific policy 
messages to its stakeholders. The remainder are delivered in off-the record environments to enable the 
bank not only to convey information (mostly analysis and outlook on economic and financial develop-
ments), but also to enhance an audience’s understanding, without risk of less formal language being 
misinterpreted by financial markets and in the news media. 
 
6.2 Social Media 
 
With approximately two billion people using social media around the world, central banks must seri-
ously consider how to engage with stakeholders through alternative channels.68 And simply establishing 
a presence on social media is not enough – stakeholders will increasingly expect banks to use social 
channels to deliver faster and more effective information about monetary policy and financial stabiliza-
tion; share upcoming events; offer knowledge about regulations; and provide a feedback mechanism 
about the accomplishment of their policy objectives. Most central banks are not delivering such services 
today. 
 To sharpen their communication and dissemination of information capabilities central banks must 
continuously improve their communication platforms capabilities by offering better response times and 
response rates through social media channels, as well as personalized services to stakeholders by inter-
preting the data that is continuously generated on social media. Since social media is all about the stake-
holders’ experience, central banks need to build their social media strategies around them. 
 In the near future social media will dramatically impact communication by central banks, as most 
banks have established a presence on various social sites. But followers and interactions are only as 
good as the meaning that can be distilled from them. As stakeholders increasingly use social media to 
share opinions on central banks’ information, banks must listen, learn and respond, as well as incorpo-
rate their social activities into their overall strategies, in order to fully attain its policy objectives. In 
most cases, this will require central banks to rethink their communication and dissemination of infor-
mation strategies to make them more stakeholder-centric. 
 Central banks can benefit in several functional areas by overcoming the risks and leveraging the 
advantages that social media provides. Social media should be embedded into a bank’s entire ecosystem 
because it impacts numerous areas, such as transparency, accountability, reputational risk management, 
customer education, etc. Central banks can reassess their communication and dissemination of infor-
mation processes once they receive feedback from stakeholders and can make changes based on infer-
ences drawn from social data. Intelligent use of social data can generate enormous value for central 
banks. Applying social analytics to the rich data sets present in tweets, blogs, posts, etc. enables them 
to derive stakeholder intelligence, understand the need for particular information in specific segments, 
develop new dissemination strategies and manage risks, all within the limits of their policy objectives 
and strategies. 
 Table 8 presents the website links to social media channels for each Federal Reserve Bank. 
 
  
                                                     
68. The frame of reference for the following analysis are: KPMG (2012), Hazarika and Nag (2014), and Investis (2015). 
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Table 8. Website links to social media channels (1) 
 
Board and District Facebook YouTube Twitter LinkedIn Flickr Pinterest Google+ Slideshare 
Board  Yes Yes Yes Yes    
1 - Boston  Yes Yes Yes     
2 - New York Yes Yes Yes     Yes 
3 - Philadelphia Yes Yes Yes Yes     
4 - Cleveland Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
5 - Richmond Yes Yes Yes      
6 - Atlanta Yes Yes Yes Yes     
7 - Chicago Yes Yes Yes      
8 - St. Louis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
9 - Minneapolis Yes Yes Yes      
10 - Kansas City  Yes Yes Yes  Yes   
11 - Dallas  Yes Yes Yes     
12 - San Francisco Yes  Yes Yes     
(1) As of July 31, 2016. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites. 
 
The Dallas Federal Reserve is also the only District on Instagram (6 publications, 14 followers, 0 fol-
lowing). Also, even though it is not on Facebook, its website has links to: (i) Economy in Action, and 
(ii) Fed careers on Facebook. The St. Louis is also on Scribd (169 publications, 5,4k views). Table 9 
details the use of social media channels by the Federal Reserve System, including the Bank´s presidents. 
 
Table 9. Use of social media channels by the Federal Reserve System 
 
Facebook (1) 
 
Board and District Joined Photos Videos Followers Likes 
2 - New York May 13, 2014 818 92 NA 12,638 
3 - Philadelphia February 18, 2011 206 No NA 1,619 
4 - Cleveland April 06, 2012 61 No NA 1,915 
5 - Richmond May 17, 2013 352 No NA 593 
6 - Atlanta June 23, 2010 590 No NA 2,589 
7 - Chicago August 10, 2007 903 5 4.1 3,155 
8 - St. Louis May 06, 2010 380 245 NA 6,107 
9 - Minneapolis April 15, 2011 56 9 NA 954 
12 - San Francisco February 24, 2010 532 24 4.0 6,194 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. NA: not available. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites.  
 
 
Board and District President Joined Likes 
7 - Chicago Charles L. Evans October 26, 2011 281 
11 - Dallas Robert S. Kaplan 2006 145 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. 
Source: Facebook.  
 
 
Twitter (1) 
 
Board and District Joined Tweets Following Followers Likes Photos/Videos 
Board March 25, 2009 2,875 25 360,437 NA 199 
1 - Boston February 4, 2009 2,799 735 40,255 115 128 
2 - New York June 10, 2008 3,455 25 108,255 2 557 
3 - Philadelphia June 11, 2009 6,150 444 43,421 68 253 
4 - Cleveland April 1, 2009 2,765 78 34,334 8 258 
5 - Richmond September 30, 2008 11,567 158 26,632 19 1,100 
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6 - Atlanta April 13, 2009 7,663 12 44,783 17 502 
7 - Chicago Jun2 12, 2009 6,792 439 56,959 896 471 
8 - St. Louis September 4, 2009 18,703 25 63,006 1 3,858 
9 - Minneapolis February 6, 2009 2,444 17 37,477 NA 372 
10 - Kansas City April 18, 2011 2,773 137 19,493 41 182 
11 - Dallas May 13, 2010 3,006 38 40,602 NA 675 
12 - San Francisco February 24, 2010 7,882 1,509 37,506 240 864 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. NA: not available. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites.  
 
 
Board and District President Joined Tweets Following Followers Likes 
9 - Minneapolis Neel Kashkari January 30, 2013 6,479 621 11,518 480 
11 - Dallas Robert S. Kaplan May 8, 2011 487 314 5,730 17 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. 
Source: Twitter.  
 
 
LinkedIn (1) 
 
Board and District Joined Followers 
Board NA 20,488 
2 - New York NA 5,780 
3 - Philadelphia NA 3,427 
4 - Cleveland NA 4,167 
6 - Atlanta NA 6,807 
8 - St. Louis NA 6,752 
10 - Kansas City NA 5,686 
11 – Dallas NA 5,280 
12 - San Francisco NA 6,792 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. NA: not available. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites.  
 
 
YouTube (1) 
 
Board and District Joined Videos Views Followers Channels 
Board January 4, 2010 120 634,909 10,143 No 
1 - Boston November 10, 2009 51 5,963 NA 1; Board 
2 - New York November 23, 2010 233 37,076 789 No 
3 - Philadelphia April 3, 2009 243 52,262 253 No 
4 - Cleveland May 29, 2009 237 128,852 337 No 
5 - Richmond August 31, 2011 51 29,244 219 10; Board, New York, Boston, St. 
Louis, Dallas, Minneapolis, Phil-
adelphia, Atlanta, Cleveland, 
Chicago 
6 - Atlanta February 17, 2011 246 237,419 688 No 
7 - Chicago October 1, 2008 118 43,964 334 21; Board, San Francisco, Bos-
ton, Richmond, Atlanta, Cleve-
land, Dallas, St. Louis, Minneap-
olis, Philadelphia 
8 - St. Louis September 8, 2009 334 365,528 2.001 No 
9 - Minneapolis October 13, 2010 272 53,309 200 No 
10 - Kansas City June 30, 2011 73 14,929 132 6; Board; New York, Dallas, Chi-
cago, Cleveland, St. Louis 
11 - Dallas November 7, 2007 41 114,587 385 No 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. NA: not available. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites.  
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Flickr (1) 
 
Board and District Joined Photos Albums Followers Favorites 
Board January, 2013 209 8 166 No 
8 - St. Louis September, 2009 44 No 9 No 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites.  
 
 
Pinterest (1) 
 
Board and District Joined Pins Following Followers Folders Likes 
4 - Cleveland NA 31 5 172 2 0 
10 - Kansas City NA 1,148 42 409 12 15 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. NA: not available. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites.  
 
Google+ (1) 
 
Board and District Joined Followers 
4 - Cleveland June 19, 2013 121 
8 - St. Louis June, 27, 2013 649 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. NA: not available. 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites.  
 
 
Slideshare (1) 
 
Board and District Joined Presentations Documents Followers Following Clipboards 
2 - New York NA 3 30 16 0 0 
(1) As of July 31, 2016. NA: not available. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York website.  
 
Figure 1 bellow consolidates the use of social media by the Federal Reserve System. 
 
Figure 1. Consolidated information of the use of social media 
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Table 10 summarizes the number of followers of all social media channels used by the Federal Reserve 
System. Even though it is no possible to be precise it is expected to exist an overlapping of followers 
within the System. 
 
Table 10. Social media channels – total followers (1) 
 
Board and District Channels Followers % of total 
Board 4 391,234 37.9 
1 – Boston (2) 3 46,035 4.5 
2 - New York 4 121,698 11.8 
3 - Philadelphia 4 48,720 4.7 
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4 - Cleveland 6 41,046 4.0 
5 - Richmond 3 27,444 2.7 
6 - Atlanta 4 54,867 5.3 
7 - Chicago 3 60,448 5.9 
8 - St. Louis (3) 7 78,524 7.6 
9 - Minneapolis 3 38,631 3.7 
10 - Kansas City 4 25,720 2.5 
11 - Dallas 4 46,281 4.5 
12 - San Francisco 3 50,492 4.9 
Total  1,031,140  
(1) As of July 31, 2016. (2) The number of followers of the Boston Bank in YouTube is not available. (3) Scrib, used by the 
St. Louis Bank was not considered (number of followers is also not available).  
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites.  
 
Table 11 gives the percentage of followers of all social media channels used by the Federal Reserve 
System. 
 
Table 11. Social media channels – % of total followers (1) 
 
Board and District Facebook YouTube Twitter LinkedIn Flickr Pinterest Google+ Slideshare 
Board  65.5 39.5 31.4 94.9    
1 – Boston (2)  NA 4.4 8.9     
2 - New York 35.3 5.1 11.9     100.0 
3 - Philadelphia 4.5 1.6 4.8 5.3     
4 - Cleveland 5.4 2.2 3.8 6.4  29.6 15.7  
5 - Richmond 1.7 1.4 2.9      
6 - Atlanta 7.2 4.4 4.9 10.4     
7 - Chicago 8.8 2.2 6.2      
8 - St. Louis (3) 17.1 12.9 6.9 10.4 5.1  84.3  
9 - Minneapolis 2.7 1.3 4.1      
10 - Kansas City  0.9 2.1 8.7  70.4   
11 - Dallas  2.5 4.4 8.1     
12 - San Francisco 17.3  4.1 10.4     
(1) As of July 31, 2016. (2) The number of followers of the Boston Bank in YouTube is not available. (3) Scrib, used by the 
St. Louis Bank was not considered (number of followers is also not available). 
Source: Federal Reserve Banks’ websites. 
 
In summary, the evidence shows a high level of discrepancy in relation to the use of social media chan-
nels to disseminate information among Banks in the Federal Reserve System. First, the overall quality 
(considering the attributes mentioned), and frequency of information available to their stakeholders in 
their websites varies. Second, the use of these channels in terms of content, quality, and frequency is 
also distinct. Third, the use of channels is highly concentrated: (i) in the case of Facebook, The New 
York Bank represents 35.3% of total followers, with St. Louis and San Francisco with nearly 17.0% 
each; (ii) for YouTube, The Board of Governors accounts for 65.5% of total followers; (iii) for Twitter, 
The Board represents 39.5% of total followers; and (iv) in the case of LinkedIn, The Board represents 
31.4% of total followers, with Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco with nearly 10.0% each. 
 
6.3 New Vision 
 
Central banks currently use social media channels as a "second class" platform of communication; how-
ever, they can scale their use of social media far beyond this by choosing the right social media channel 
and analytics tools, and making other internal changes, including the following: 
- investing in new tools: before selecting a tool or platform, central banks need to have a vision of their 
social media objectives, evaluate the tendencies in channels used by stakeholders, and what other central 
banks are doing (benchmarking); 
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- establishing new metrics: central banks need metrics to measure the effectiveness of their social strat-
egy, and these metrics will probably differ from bank to bank, based on their objectives. Once the metrics 
are established, banks need to analyze the data, identify their most important stakeholders, pinpoint 
where they are talking about, and discover what is being said. These insights will be invaluable for 
improving the dissemination of information; 
- redesigning the IT infrastructure: social media success requires a robust IT architecture that can harness 
stakeholders’ formation in the context of burgeoning social data to deepen relationships. As such, it is 
very important to put technology at the forefront of planning and execution;69 
- designing internal processes: central banks will need to evaluate processes to encourage collaboration 
across dispersed teams, with different levels of expertise (for e.g., researchers and staff involved in 
education for the general public). Doing so will enable them to arm the right individual(s) with the right 
information, at the right time, in the right format needed to address stakeholders’ preferences at every 
stage of their relationship; 
-  establishing new policies: central banks have to exercise discretion when collecting, processing and 
sharing policy information and consider privacy issues. This is a fundamental constraint on the dissem-
ination of information to stakeholders, especially because of its impact in financial markets.  
 An approximate blueprint for a successful social media strategy can be summed up in the following 
steps: (i) develop a vision and gather needed organizational support for embracing social media strategy; 
(ii) define the scope and objectives for the social media strategy; (iii) determine the right metrics for 
measuring the effectiveness of the strategy; (iv) draft a robust risk mitigation plan before engaging in 
social platforms; (v) understand the regulatory and compliance requirements to be observed on the dis-
semination of information through social media channels; (vi) integrate the technology infrastructure to 
advance the social strategy and achieve the policy objectives; (vii) ensure organization-wide cultural 
assimilation of the social strategy; (viii) achieve stakeholder centricity through the social strategy. 
 
6.4 Challenges 
 
Social media has irrevocably changed the way organizations interact with their stakeholders. For central 
banks, in particular, the continuing rise of social media channels signals a new dawn; an evolution that 
offers significant opportunities and challenges. These channels are a rapidly and constantly evolving 
environment and, as a result, central banks will need to ensure that they are staying on top of the latest 
trends and taking advantage of the greatest opportunities to disseminate information to its stakeholders.70 
Taking into account the challenges faced by other organizations the main issues for which central banks 
need to devise a strategy are the following: 
- management of risk: likely the biggest challenge facing banks as they consider their social media 
strategy is risk. It is usually accepted that social media represents a clear and present danger where the 
actions of both customers and employees pose a reputational risk for banks; 
- integrating IT: getting the most out of social media requires central banks to rethink the way they 
integrate their technology platforms. Creating the optimal IT environment for social media requires more 
than simply opening up an account in a particular channel;71 
                                                     
69. To reap the rewards of a social strategy, many central banks will need to redesign their traditional IT infrastructure. 
Technology must be consolidated to deliver a unified, consistent and fully integrated experience regardless of the channel of 
engagement. The IT infrastructure must be rewired to transcend inter-departmental barriers, divisional boundaries and isolated 
groups to provide a smooth and seamless experience. This will allow central banks to present a single face to stakeholders. An 
integrated IT architecture that employs social media needs to encompass the entire content of information, segmented by stake-
holder and social media channel. This will allow central banks to communicate effectively, and reduce costs of non-value-
added information (besides that demanded by regulatory compliance). 
70. For a detailed analysis of challenges faced by banks in general concerning the use of social media see, e.g., KPMG 
(2012). 
71. Indeed, central banks must carefully consider how they can bring information (press releases, speeches, events, research, 
data, etc.) together into a single IT platform to make it more accessible, and responsive to their stakeholders. 
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- creating a social culture: central banks are taking divergent paths to social media channels, in particular, 
opting for some of the available alternatives (in particular, Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and LinkedIn). 
Some are embedding social media into segments of their information dissemination to take advantage 
of innovation in the emerging social media market; 
- gaining management support: given the ubiquitous and transformative impact of social media, it is 
critical that senior management of central banks fully engage in the development of the banks’ strategy 
to properly manage risk and ensure that initiatives are internally aligned. With management support it 
is the responsibility of the internal communications team to establish a framework to support that – 
ensuring that information is accessible, easily digestible, and relayed in a timely fashion to the bank’s 
stakeholders; 
- the demands of data: one of the greatest opportunities for central banks is to leverage the data that can 
be gleaned from social media channels to improve the process of information dissemination. But man-
aging the avalanche of social media channels creates a number of unique challenges and consideration 
for central banks; 
- building a single customer view: dealing with stakeholders over social media channels requires central 
banks to achieve a holistic view of them across all of their various interactions. Central banks will need 
to put themselves in the stakeholders’ shoes if they hope to develop valuable relationships, in particular, 
with the general public. They will need to work across multiple social media channels to deliver more 
responsive and valuable information and truly engage with their stakeholders; 
- the compliance challenge: regulation and compliance influences the business and operating model of 
all central banks, regardless of their size or geographic scope. This, in turn puts additional constrains on 
the quality, objectivity, utility, integrity, reproducibility, influence, and transparency of the information 
made available through social media channels. 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
With approximately two billion people using social media around the world, central banks must seri-
ously consider how to engage with stakeholders through alternative channels. And simply establishing 
a presence on social media is not enough – stakeholders will increasingly expect banks to use social 
channels to deliver faster and more effective information about monetary policy and financial stabiliza-
tion; share upcoming events; offer knowledge about regulations; and provide a feedback mechanism 
about the accomplishment of their policy objectives. Most central banks are not delivering such services 
today. 
 Social media is a relatively recent innovation that allows for corporate communications opportuni-
ties that a decade ago would not have been plausible. In particular, social media allows companies to 
communicate directly and instantly with their stakeholders, marking a shift from the traditional one-way 
to two-way communication. Engaging in social media has not been as straight forward for central banks 
as for private banks (and the private sector in general). Even more challenging for them it is to build, 
and crucially maintain, a successful presence in that online environment they neither own nor control. 
As a consequence of its function in the institutional environment a central bank usually sees the control 
of information in a different level compared to a private entity. This, in turn, might explain the uneasi-
ness of central banks with most channels of social media.72 
 The social media channels should be considered by central banks not as an instrument for better 
transparency but, instead, as an up-to-date communication instrument. Since transparency is a key at-
tribute of communication, the more advanced central banks in terms of communication are, in general, 
                                                     
72. The seminar, "Communications and External Relations for Central Banks" in Windsor, United Kingdom, April 19-22, 
2016, was about central bank transparency and communication issues and the challenges central banks face nowadays in em-
barking on the strategy of openness and proactive communications with the public. 
  29 
those which have begun routinely using social media channels as one of their communication instru-
ments. If a central bank is less transparent about policy, it has little information to disseminate, and as a 
result it makes no sense to open a Facebook, Twitter or YouTube account.  
 For more than 20 years central banks’ websites, in the United States and abroad, have been trans-
forming into digital news and information hubs. Due to a necessity of overall consistency in the dissem-
ination of information it is expected that the content made available to stakeholders in the website at a 
given time will, over time, be reflected in the social media channels used. But for that to really accom-
modate both the interests of the different stakeholders and the segmentation of the channels it is neces-
sary that the content (both text and image) that describe what central banks do will need to vary across 
channels, and be tailored to the needs of each individual stakeholder of a given channel. 
 In summary, the evidence shows a high level of discrepancy in relation to the use of social media 
channels to disseminate information among Banks in the Federal Reserve System. First, the overall 
quality (considering the attributes mentioned), and frequency of information available to their stake-
holders in their websites varies. Second, the use of social media channels in terms of content, quality, 
and frequency is also distinct. Third, the use of channels is highly concentrated: (i) in the case of Face-
book, The New York Bank represents 35.3% of total followers, with St. Louis and San Francisco with 
nearly 17.0% each; (ii) for YouTube, The Board of Governors accounts for 65.5% of total followers; 
(iii) for Twitter, The Board represents 39.5% of total followers; and (iv) in the case of LinkedIn, The 
Board represents 31.4% of total followers, with Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco with nearly 10.0% 
each. 
 Overall, the Federal Reserve System adopts and makes available to stakeholders the same platforms 
for the dissemination of information. They use the same general structure of alternatives, but with sig-
nificant differences in accessibility, availability, and quality. There are many options to improve the 
current offerings in these three attributes when one takes into account not only the best practice within 
the System but also that adopt by central banks in other jurisdictions, and even organizations in the 
private sector. 
 An even more restricted environment is observed for the Banks’ presidents, with only three of them 
present on social medias (two on Facebook and two on Twitter). The president of the Dallas Bank com-
municates using both channels. 
 In the near future it is expected that the websites of central banks will mostly evolve to include a 
variety of more attractive content, including, for e.g.: (i) live webcast of a press releases and conferences, 
(ii) presentations by economists about some research topic, and (iii) speeches by the governor, president 
or another senior policymaker. These broadcasts, made available by the central bank should be non-
discriminatory (available not only to subscribers of, say, Reuters or Bloomberg) and give the stakehold-
ers an opportunity to interact. 
 As central banks focus on efficiency of their operations, often through attention to and specializa-
tion in core functions, budgets tighten and areas are downsized or outsourced. Communication depart-
ments are not exempt from this. And this raises some key questions: How can communication depart-
ments ensure that they have the right skills or access to skills to send out the right information that fits 
with the central bank policy objectives? How can they demonstrate value to senior management? How 
can they keep pace with the outside world, yet not lose sense of the identity and values of the institution, 
and the constraints under which it operates? 
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